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Many countries use duty drawbacks on exports, yet they have been given little attention in 
the literature and there is no consensus whether countries should embrace or abandon 
them. This paper asserts that the answer depends on a country’s development priorities and 
economic conditions. An increase in the drawback has a positive impact on export 
competitiveness and employment, but could lead to exports with low domestic value 
added. The welfare effects of duty drawback reform are ambiguous. An increase in the 
drawback is more likely to be welfare improving if the economy is small with high input 
tariffs, low initial drawback, low administrative costs and leakages in the tariff collection 
system. In China duty drawback removal after meeting its WTO commitments will deepen 
domestic supply chains and improve welfare, but will hurt China’s economic efficiency, 
export competitiveness and real factor incomes. Further liberalization could mitigate these 
negative effects.    
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Many countries use duty drawbacks on exports, yet they have been given relatively little 
attention in the literature and there is no consensus whether countries should embrace or 
abandon them. This paper asserts that the answer depends on the country’s development 
priorities and economic conditions. An increase in the duty drawback has a positive impact 
on export competitiveness and employment in the export-oriented industries, but could 
lead to exports with low domestic value added. The welfare effects of duty drawback and 
trade reform in the presence of a drawback are ambiguous in general. An increase in the 
drawback is more likely to enhance welfare if the economy is small with high input tariffs 
and intensity of imported input use in the export-oriented sectors, low initial drawback, 
low administrative costs and leakages in the tariff collection system. In such an economy 
liberalizing intermediate good markets can be welfare enhancing if the cost share of the 
imported input is higher in the export-processing than in the import-competing sector. This 
is more likely to be true for a lower duty drawback and higher intensity of import use in 
the export-oriented sector. If there is a complete duty drawback, liberalizing intermediate 
input markets is unambiguously welfare reducing. In China duty drawback removal after 
meeting its WTO commitments will deepen domestic supply chains and improve welfare, 
but will hurt China’s economic efficiency, output growth, export competitiveness in key 
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1. Introduction 
Economic theory traditionally considers trade liberalization to be the reduction or complete 
removal of existing trade restrictions and economists typically endorse it as a ‘first-best’ 
type of trade liberalization. While removal of existing trade barriers is the most direct way 
to free trade, many economies have chosen more gradual and flexible approaches. These 
involve ‘concessional’ trade liberalization instruments including intra-industry 
liberalization via duty drawback schemes, sub-national liberalization through the 
development of export processing zones (EPZs), firm-specific liberalization by negotiating 
import rights with individual firms or expanding eligibility for import permits, and regional 
trade liberalization by forming regional free trade blocs.  
This paper focuses on one type of ‘concenssional’ trade instruments – duty 
drawbacks (or rebates).
1 These reduce or eliminate the duties paid on imported 
intermediates or raw materials used in the production of exports. A firm importing an 
intermediate product for use in the production of an export good is either exempt from the 
tariff payments on the imported input (duty exemption system) or gets a refund of the tariff 
payments made once the final product is exported (rebate or duty drawback system).  
Duty drawbacks have been popular as an indirect tax incentive for foreign direct 
investment and an instrument to reduce the anti-export bias of otherwise highly protected 
economies.
2,3  Despite their wide use, duty drawbacks have been given relatively little 
                                                 
1 In this paper we abstract from the administrative aspects of obtaining a refund and use the term duty 
drawback to refer to both drawbacks and exemptions. The important point is that any tariff payments for 
imported inputs get back to the producer if the final product is exported. Wu and Chuang (1998) describe in 
detail the functioning of the duty drawback systems in Taiwan (China) and Costa Rica. 
2 Full duty drawbacks reduce, but do not completely eliminate the anti-export bias, since tariffs on final 
goods continue to provide positive effective protection to the domestic-oriented sectors. 
3 Duty drawbacks have been popular in both developed and developing countries (see International Monetary 
Fund, 2002). Michalopoulos (1999) finds that all but three economies (Benin, Singapore and Hong Kong) in 
a sample of 42 developing economies have in place some form of duty drawbacks. However, some 
economies have used duty drawbacks with more success than others. For instance, most East Asian   4
attention in the literature.
4 Herander (1986) was among the first to study the implications 
of duty drawbacks for the structure of protection.
5 Using the standard framework for the 
analysis of effective protection
6 and assuming that foreign and domestic goods are perfect 
substitutes, he identifies the conditions determining whether domestic component 
producers or domestic final good consumers will bear the costs of export expansion 
following the introduction of duty drawbacks. He finds that when domestic final good 
consumption is low relative to domestic component production, domestic component 
producers are worse off, while domestic consumers are better off with duty drawbacks. 
When domestic final good consumption is high relative to domestic component 
production, domestic component producers retain their protection while consumers face a 
higher price if duty drawbacks are coupled with a large final good import tariff. This 
results in a protection structure of escalating tariffs, which is typical for many countries.
7 
Conversely, domestic component producers lose, while domestic final good consumers 
benefit if final good tariffs are lowered or completely eliminated. This results in a 
protection structure of de-escalating tariffs and the emergence of two-way trade.        
Panagariya (1992) analyzed the welfare implications of trade reform in the 
presence of duty drawbacks in a small open economy with perfectly competitive markets. 
                                                                                                                                                    
economies have used duty drawback schemes effectively, whereas in many African countries poor execution 
of such schemes has led to very few benefits for exporters (Hinkle et al. 2003). 
4 In January  2004 the ‘ECONLIT’ database contained 5 articles on duty drawbacks, 1 on export drawbacks 
and 1 on export linkages. Considerably more attention has been given to exploring the implications of 
different kinds of protectionism including voluntary export restraints (VERs), ‘strategic’ trade interventions, 
and more recently to EPZs. The ECONLIT database contained 133 references to ‘voluntary export 
restraints’,  324 to ‘strategic trade’ and 48 to ‘export processing zones’. 
5 Balassa et al. (1970) discussed in detail the duty drawback policies of several developing countries, while 
Hufbauer and Erb (1984) surveyed such policies in developed countries.  
6 The standard framework for the analysis of effective protection assumes a fixed coefficient, two-stage 
production process (component production and final good assembly), upward sloping supply curve for 
factors (value added) and intermediate inputs (components), perfectly competitive markets, exogenous world 
prices of components and final goods.  
7 World Bank data at www.worldbank.org/trade indicate that 48 out of 86 economies had escalating tariffs on 
industrial products between 1994 and 2000. One country (Bolivia) had de-escalating tariffs and the rest had a 
mix of increasing and decreasing tariff rates from one stage to another.    5
He arrived at three broad conclusions in the case when goods are substitutes in 
consumption and production, and there is no two-way trade in the good intended for 
exports. An increase in the duty drawback, when none has been in place in the initial 
equilibrium, is welfare improving up to a point. Increases in tariffs on inputs 
complemented by full duty drawbacks are welfare improving up to a point. Tariffs on 
inputs unaccompanied by duty drawbacks on exports have an ambiguous effect on welfare.  
In more recent years economists have focused their attention on duty drawbacks 
and the speed of trade liberalization. In general there is no agreement on this issue. Gruen 
(1999) argues that ‘concessional’ trade liberalization instruments enable the trade 
liberalization path to be specified in a flexible way ensuring targeted and gradual trade 
reform, which may not be possible using traditional tariff dismantling.
8 Cadot et al. (2003) 
however show that in a political-economy setting, where tariffs and duty drawbacks are 
endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, full duty drawbacks granted to exporters 
slow down trade liberalization since they decrease exporters’ incentives to counter-lobby 
against high tariffs on their inputs.  
There is also no consensus whether countries should embrace duty drawbacks or 
whether and when they should abandon them. In the past the World Bank recommended in 
their loans the creation or improvements of duty drawback and temporary admission 
regimes (Krueger and Rajapatirana, 1999). A World Bank study by Thomas et al. (1991) 
also made a strong case in favor of duty drawbacks as instruments of export promotion 
when there is import protection. But more recently the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 
2002) warns against the use of duty drawbacks and other indirect tax incentives since they 
                                                 
8 The political economy climate in a country is an important reason for choosing a duty drawback scheme 
over liberalization. In China, for instance, the government could never have gotten a full free trade regime in 
the late seventies, but it could get an agreement to liberalize tariffs on imports used in the production of 
exports.   6
can lead to abuses, are difficult to justify on policy grounds and offer second best 
solutions.
9  
Earlier studies conducted their analysis at the aggregate level producing few 
indicators that can guide policy discussions at the industry level. We address this gap in the 
literature by analyzing not only the welfare outcome, but the economic and industry-level 
impacts of duty drawback and trade reform in the presence of domestic distortions. Using a 
modified á la Panagariya (1992) model we first study the welfare implications of duty 
drawback and trade reform. Unlike Panagariya (1992) we do not restrict the analysis to a 
small open economy. The small country assumption simplifies the analysis,
10 but may not 
be appropriate for some countries. The welfare analysis improves over previous work by 
taking into account domestic tax distortions,
11 and extending the analysis beyond reform of 
input tariffs and duty drawbacks. We also depart from the standard representation of a 
single sector involved in two types of activities – producing for domestic and export 
markets, and instead distinguish between two sectors specialized in two types of activities 
– one sector produces only exports, the other produces only for the domestic market. This 
separation is preferable to representations based on a single sector because it allows the 
                                                 
9 Acknowledging the common use of duty drawbacks worldwide as an export and foreign investment 
incentive, the IMF concludes that tariff drawbacks should be used only for export purposes (much of the 
economists’ skepticism about duty exemptions is about exemptions not related to exports) and that countries 
with weak customs and tax administrations should choose duty rebates instead of exemptions in order to 
minimize the risk of tariff leakages. However, evidence suggests that exporters in many countries with rebate 
schemes have found it difficult to collect refunds. Uncertainties of payment and delays of up to a year in the 
reimbursement of import duties were major problems, for instance, in Uganda (1996), South Africa (1996), 
Tanzania (1996) and Zimbabwe (1998) (Hinkle et al. 2003). These delays render the drawbacks schemes 
ineffective.  
10 The small economy assumption implies that the country is a price taker and domestic reforms will not 
affect world prices so that they can be fixed at 1. 
11 Omitting domestic tax distortions from the analysis of trade reform may bias its conclusions (Konan and 
Maskus, 2000). First, in a second-best world reductions in trade barriers could raise or lower the marginal 
excess burden of the existing tax structure. Second, as governments lose revenues from liberalization, they 
may be forced to raise domestic tax rates in compensation.     7
two sectors to use different input mixes, and the export-oriented activities to use much 
more import-intensive means of production (Ianchovichina, 2004).    
We then undertake an empirical evaluation of the economic effects of duty 
drawback and trade reform using a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model. 
We assess the impacts of duty drawback removal in China after the implementation of 
China’s WTO accession commitments and compare this policy with other reform options 
for China’s post-WTO trading system. This is an interesting case-study because China has 
had a well functioning duty drawback system for more than two decades, but with the fall 
in China’s post-WTO tariffs and the costs associated with the system time has come to 
question whether it is worthwhile to keep the system.   
The following conclusions emerge from this paper. There is no straightforward 
answer to the question whether duty drawbacks on exports are worth the hassle. The 
answer depends on the country’s development priorities and economic conditions. An 
increase in the duty drawback has a positive impact on export competitiveness and 
employment in the export-oriented industries, but could lead to exports with low domestic 
value added.
12 The welfare effects of duty drawback and trade reform are ambiguous. An 
increase in the drawback is more likely to enhance welfare if the economy is small with 
negative effective protection on the export processing activities and positive protection on 
the domestic-oriented activities, high input tariffs and intensity of imported input use in the 
                                                 
12 It is important to point out that changes in domestic value added do not affect the welfare measures 
presented in this paper. For changes in domestic value added to have welfare consequences the welfare 
function must reflect features not present in this paper  (e.g. love of variety). Furthermore, a strict view of 
economics is that it does not matter whether exports under duty drawback arrangements have low value 
added. Still policy makers pay attention to the domestic value added content of their exports since backward 
and forward linkages affect where goods are produced. In addition, one of the key lessons of the new 
economic geography literature is that there may be substantial gains from activities that encourage the 
development of backward and forward linkages (Amiti 2003). Incentives toward shallow processing 
activities such as duty drawbacks may cause highly protected economies to miss many opportunities for 
growth. Therefore, this paper reports changes in domestic value added in addition to the welfare estimates.       8
export-oriented sectors, low initial drawback, and low administrative costs and leakages in 
the tariff collection system. We find that duty drawback removal after China meets its 
WTO commitments will deepen domestic supply chains and improve welfare, but will hurt 
China’s economic efficiency, output growth, export competitiveness in key manufacturing 
industries and real factor incomes. Further liberalization could mitigate the negative 
effects.    
Section 2 introduces a model for the welfare analysis of duty drawback and trade 
reform. Section 3 presents the empirical multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium 
model with duty drawbacks. Section 4 discusses key features of China’s duty drawback 
system and analyzes reform options for China’s post WTO trading system. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Welfare analysis of duty drawback and trade reform  
We use a modified Panagariya (1992) type model to which we add domestic tax distortions 
and completely separated production for export and domestic markets. The separation 
between domestic and export markets is preferable to the one based on a single sector 
producing for domestic and export markets since it allows the two sectors to use different 
input mixes, and the export-oriented activities to use much more import-intensive means of 
production.
13 It is also a fairly accurate depiction of the trade regime in countries where 
duty drawbacks are used as export promotion instruments while protection on the rest of 
the economy is fairly high.
14 Unlike Panagariya (1992) we do not restrict the analysis to a 
                                                 
13 Ianchovichina (2004) found that exporting activities in China had become much more import-intensive 
than other industries because of the incentives created by duty exemptions. 
14 In a deterministic world, an export producer will always take advantage of duty drawbacks or rebates 
unless the administrative costs are prohibitive.   9
small open economy. This assumption simplifies the analysis, but may not be appropriate 
for  countries that are large enough to affect world prices of some product groups. 
We have an open economy with perfectly competitive markets. There are 3 
industries (D, X, and N) producing 3 final goods using F factors of production. Industry D 
specializes in good D, which competes with imports and is sold in the domestic market 
only. Industry X specializes in export good X sold only abroad. Industry N produces a 
freely traded good N. Final goods D and X use an imported intermediate good M, which is 
not produced at home, while good N does not use the imported good. We assume that the 
value added ( jr V ) is a linear homogenous function, transport costs are negligible, export 
taxes and taxes on intermediate inputs and factor inputs are zero.  
The supply price of good D ( D p ) is the world price 
W D p adjusted for any import 
tariffs (t), and output taxes ( 0 > D τ ) or subsidies ( 0 < D τ ), i.e.  )] 1 /( ) 1 [( D D D t p p
W τ + + = . 
The supply price of good X ( X p ) is the world price 
W X p  adjusted for any export taxes 
( 0 >
X τ ) or subsidies ( 0 <
X τ ), i.e.  ) 1 /( X X X W p p τ + = . We choose the units of value 
added in such a way that it takes 1 unit of value added to produce 1 unit of a final product. 
From these assumptions and the zero-profit condition it follows that the prices of value-
added in sectors D and X are respectively: 
, ) 1 ( ) 1 /( ) 1 (
W W
D
M D M D D
v p a t t p p + − + + = τ  
, )) 1 ( 1 ( ) 1 /(
W W
X
M X M X X
v p a t p p φ τ − + − + =
 
where 
W M p is  the world price of the input good M, t
M is the tariff on the input M, a
i 
(i=X,D) is the input-output ratio in sector i. If φ =1, the export-oriented sector gets a 
complete duty drawback of import duties paid on inputs used in the production of exports.   10
If 0<φ <1, the export-oriented sector gets a partial duty drawback. If φ =0, there is no duty 
drawback and import taxes are the same for sectors X and D. 
Under free trade and no domestic distortions, the price of value added in sector i is: 
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The effective rates of protection (ERPs) in domestic and export-oriented sectors are 
therefore: 
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Under free trade ( 0 = = M t t ) and no domestic distortions ( 0 = =
X D τ τ ), the price of 
value added of the import competing, domestic-oriented sector D is 
W W M D D p a p − , while 
that of the export-oriented sector X is 
W W M X X p a p − . In this case the ERPs on both sectors 
are 0. If the tariff on the final good is high enough so that 
W W W W D D D M D M M D M p p p a t p a t t / ] ) ( [ τ + + ≥ , the ERP of sector D is positive. This is more 
likely to be the case when tariffs are uniform or escalating ( M t t ≥ ) and there is an output 
tax  0 ≥ D τ .
15 
The ERP of sector X is negative unless the sector gets an export subsidy ( 0 ≥
X τ ). If 
there is a complete duty drawback ( 1 = φ ), the ERP of sector X becomes 0 when all other 
                                                 
15 In the case of a subsidy we assume that subsidy rate τ is less than 100% so that the power of the subsidy 
(1+τ) is positive.    11
distortions in sector X are zero ( 0 =
X τ ),
16 negative when X is taxed ( 0 >
X τ ), and 
positive when X is protected with an export subsidy ( 0 <
X τ ).  
The equilibrium in the economy is given by: 




v v + = + ,               (A) 
where  ) 1 , , (
X D v v p p R 17 is the revenue function of the economy obtained by maximizing 
the GDP subject to full employment;  ) ; 1 , ) 1 (( u p t E
W D +  is the expenditure function 
obtained by minimizing spending in order to achieve welfare no worse than u;
18 and T is 
the tax revenue, collected by the government and distributed to consumers: 
.     
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The first term is the tariff revenue raised from imports of good D, the second and third 
terms specify the tariff revenue raised from imports of intermediate inputs used for the 
production of goods D and X, the fourth term is the expenditure made on the duty 
drawbacks, the fifth and sixth terms are the revenue (expenditure) associated with output 
taxes (subsidies) in sectors D and X, respectively.
19  
We assume that the economy is distorted in the initial equilibrium 
( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠
X D M t t τ τ ),
20 the domestic-oriented sector D faces positive ERPs ( 0 >
D e ), 
while the export-oriented sector X faces negative ERPs ( 0 ≤ X e ). Ceteris paribus, the ERP 
                                                 
16  In this case, there is still an anti-export bias unless protection to sector D is negative because of an output 
tax. 
17 The vector of factor endowments has been suppressed for the sake of brevity. 
18 Since good X is not consumed domestically E(.) is a function of prices of goods D and N only. 
19Assuming that good D is good 1, while good X is good 2, the supply of good i is given by the first partial of 
R(.) with respect to the ith argument. The demand for good 1 is given by the first partial of E(.) with respect 
to the 1st argument. The assumption that all of product X is exported implies that the domestic demand for 
good X is zero. 
20 We assume that trade and domestic taxes are exogenous.    12
of sector D is more likely to be positive, the higher the tariff on final imports, and the 
output subsidy in sector D, and the lower the intensity of imported input used in sector D, 
and the input tariff. Ceteris paribus, the ERP of sector X is more likely to be negative the 
higher the export tax on sector X, and the lower the initial duty drawback.
21 
We look at the welfare effects of the following three policy scenarios: (2.1) duty 
drawback reform; (2.2) liberalizing trade in intermediate inputs; and (2.3) liberalizing trade 
in final and intermediate products. In all three scenarios we discuss separately the 
following two special cases: (i) the respective policy reform without duty drawback in the 
initial equilibrium ( 0 = φ ); (ii) the policy reform with complete duty drawback in place in 
the initial equilibrium ( 1 = φ ). World prices are reduced-form functions of the reform 
variables, i.e.  ) , , ( t t p M DW φ ,    ) , , ( t t p M XW φ ,  and  ) , , ( t t p M MW φ . 
 
2.1 Duty drawback reform 
The welfare effect of a change in the duty drawback policy can be assessed by totally 
differentiating the equilibrium condition (A) and setting  0 = = = =
X D M d d dt dt τ τ . 
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    (B) 
Unless otherwise noted, we assume that goods exhibit substitutability in production (i.e. 
0 12 < R ), demand is downward sloping, while supply is upward sloping (i.e. 0 11 < E  
and 0 , 0 22 11 > > R R ), and goods are normal so that the term on the left-hand side of (B) is 
positive. Therefore, the sign of du/dt
M is the same as the sign of the right-hand-side of (B). 
                                                 
21 Notice that under this specification ERPs may be nonzero even when import taxes are zero (t=t
M=0).   13
The first three terms on the right-hand-side of equation (B) capture the terms of 
trade effect of duty drawback reform. In general this effect is ambiguous. The sign of the 
first term depends on whether the country is a net importer or exporter of good D and 
whether the increase in the drawback reform leads to an increase or decrease in the world 
price of good D. For instance, an increase in the duty drawback may lead to a rise in the 
world price of good M following an increase in the demand for the input in sector X, a drop 
in the world price of good X following an increase in the supply of good X, and a rise in the 
world price of good D as the domestic sector contracts and imports of good D rise. In this 
case, the terms of trade effect is likely to be negative. 
The last two terms depict the resource allocation effect (or the allocative efficiency 
effect) of duty drawback reform. In general this effect is ambiguous. It will be positive 
(negative) if the price of value added in sector X rises (drops), while the price of value 
added in sector D drops (rises). In this case the increase in the drawback leads to an 
expansion of the export-oriented sector X, which faces negative ERPs ( 0 < X e ), and a 
contraction of the protected domestic-oriented sector D ( 0 > D e ). Both changes increase 
welfare. 
In the case when world prices are fixed, the welfare effect of duty drawback reform 
is determined entirely by the resource allocation effect.
22 
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                 (B’) 
The welfare effect of an increase (decrease) in the duty drawback is unambiguously 
positive (negative). This is the case because the increase in the drawback results in the rise 
                                                 
22 The case when the country is small and there is one sector producing good X that can be sold both abroad 
and locally is presented in Panagariya (1992). In this paper, an increase in the duty drawback has an 
ambiguous consumption effect since consumption of good X declines and that of good D increases. This 
leads to the conclusion that the effect of an increase in the duty drawback is ambiguous in general.    14
of the value added in sector X followed by an expansion of the negatively protected export-
oriented sector and a contraction of the positively protected domestic-oriented sector. Both 
changes are welfare enhancing.    
  The intensity of input use in the export-oriented sector X and the tariff on the 
imported input are proportionate to the welfare effect of tariff reform. The higher the 
intensity of imported input use in the export-oriented sector or the tariff on the imported 
input, the larger the effective rate of protection on sector X and the increase in the price of 
value added in the export sector, in turn implying a larger welfare change as this distortion 
is reduced. The extent of the drawback is inversely related to the welfare effect of tariff 
reform. A higher extent of the drawback φ  implies lower absolute value of the ERP in the 
export-oriented sector and a lower welfare change of duty drawback reform (see equation 
B’). This leads us to proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. The welfare effect of a small increase (reduction) in the duty drawback is 
ambiguous in general. If the country is small the welfare effect of a small increase 
(decrease) in the drawback is unambiguously positive (negative). In this case the higher 
the intensity of imported input use in the export-oriented sector and the tariff on the 
imported input, and the lower the initial drawback, the larger the magnitude of the welfare 
effect. 
 
2.2  Liberalizing trade in intermediate inputs 
The welfare effect of liberalizing trade in intermediate inputs can be assessed by totally 
differentiating the equilibrium condition (A) and setting 0 = = = =
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  (C)
   The first three terms on the right-hand-side of equation (C) represent the terms-of-
trade effect. As discussed earlier in general this effect is ambiguous. A tariff cut on input M 
is likely to reduce the domestic prices of goods D and X, possibly lowering the world 
prices of goods D and X, and increasing the demand and the world price of input M. The 
fall in the world price of good D is welfare enhancing since the country is a net importer of 
good D, while the increase in the world price of input M and the fall in the world price of 
good X is welfare reducing since the country is an importer of good M  and an exporter of 
good X and. The net terms-of-trade effect is ambiguous.  
  The third term captures the allocation effect on the demand side. Its sign depends 
on whether the price of good D rises or falls following the tariff cuts on good M. If the 
world price of good D drops as a result of the tariff cut on input M (i.e.  0 / > ∂ ∂ M D t p
W ), 
there will be an increased consumption of the protected good D. This has a positive effect 
on welfare since in the initial equilibrium there is under-consumption of D. Otherwise, the 
effect is negative.    
  The last two terms capture the resource allocation effect on the supply side. In 
general this effect is ambiguous. It is unambiguously positive if the tariff cut increases the 
prices of value added in the negatively protected export sector X (i.e.  0 / < ∂ ∂ M
V t p
X ), and 
decreases the price of value added in the protected domestic sector D (i.e.  0 / > ∂ ∂ M
V t p
D ). 
  In the small country case when world prices are fixed (C) transforms into:    16
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     (C’) 
and the welfare effect is captured entirely by the resource allocation effect of a change in 
tariffs on intermediate inputs. An unambiguous increase in welfare requires that the 
decrease in the tariff 
M t is associated with a contraction of the protected domestic-oriented 
sector D and an expansion of the negatively protected export-oriented sector X.  Since in 
this case this condition is not satisfied, the welfare effect of a decline in tariffs on 
intermediate imported inputs is ambiguous. However, if there is a complete duty drawback 
then a tariff cut (increase) on the intermediate imported input is unambiguously welfare 
reducing (enhancing). This is the case because the tariff cut (increase) leads to an increase 
(a decrease) in the price of value added in the protected sector D, and an expansion 
(contraction) of this sector. 
  Assuming that the economy’s only two producing sectors are D and X, all of good 




































tE E ,               (C”) 
where Ω is defined as φ φ D X D X X D a a p a p a − − − = Ω ) 1 (   . The right hand side of (C’) will be 
negative, if and only if Ω<0, or equivalently if 
X X D D D p a a p a / ) ) 1 /(( < + − φ φ . In this 
case a reduction in tariffs on intermediate inputs unambiguously enhances welfare.  
In order to explain this result let us assume that there is no duty drawback at 
equilibrium. With a decline in the intermediate tariff, the distortion in production declines 
                                                 
23 Considerable manipulation is required before (C) is transformed into (C’). In deriving (C’) we make use of 
the property that the supply function Ri(.) is zero-degree homogenous in prices.   17
and welfare rises provided that the costs decline more in the export-oriented sector X. This 
happens if Ω<0, or equivalently if the cost share of the input is higher in the export sector 
X rather than the domestic-sector D (
X X D D p a p a / / < ). Otherwise, the welfare is 
unambiguously negative.  
Let us assume that there is a complete duty drawback at equilibrium. This implies 
that Ω>0 since the cost share is less than 1, i.e.  1 / <
X X p a . In this case a reduction on 
tariffs of intermediate products is unambiguously welfare reducing. This result can be 
explained with the fact that the distortion in production increases since costs decline more 
in the protected sector than in the export-oriented sector. Costs in the export-oriented 
sector cannot be further reduced since the sector is already benefiting from the complete 
duty drawback. The domestic-oriented sector D expands relative to the export-oriented 
one, leading to an unambiguous decline in welfare. 
Noticing that the denominator in  ) ) 1 /(( φ φ
D D D a p a + − is a decreasing function of 
the duty drawbackφ , we conclude that the higher the duty drawback the less important are 
the relative cost shares for the outcome of the tariff reform and the more likely it is that the 
welfare outcome of a decline in intermediate input tariffs is welfare reducing. 
Proposition 2. The welfare effect of liberalizing imports of intermediate inputs is 
ambiguous. If the country is small with a compete duty drawback at equilibrium, a tariff 
cut on intermediate inputs is unambiguously welfare reducing. If the country is small and 
produces only good X and D, the welfare effect of such a reform is positive only 
if X X D D D p a a p a / ) ) 1 /(( < + − φ φ . This is less likely to be true for higher duty drawback 
and lower intensity of import use in the export-oriented sector. If there is no duty 
drawback in the initial equilibrium, the welfare effect of a reduction in intermediate input   18
tariffs is unambiguously positive when the cost share of the input is higher in the export-
oriented sector than in the import-competing sector (
X X D D p a p a / / < ). 
  
2.3 Liberalizing trade in final and intermediate products 
The welfare effect of liberalizing trade in final and intermediate products can be assessed 
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respect to t by totally differentiating (A) and setting  0 = = = = X D M d d d dt τ τ φ . The 
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The first term in square brackets displays the factors determining the welfare effect 
of a change in tariffs on intermediate inputs. As discussed in section 2.2 this effect is 
ambiguous in general. The second term in square brackets presents the factors determining 
the welfare effect of a change in tariffs on good D.    19
The first three terms in the second square brackets measure the terms of trade effect 
of the tariff change on good D. In general this effect is ambiguous. The sign of the first 
term depends on whether the country is a net importer or exporter of good D and whether 
the tariff cut on good D leads to an increase or decrease in the world price of good D. The 
tariff cut encourages imports of D, and leads to a contraction of sector D and an expansion 
of sector X. This in turn may lead to an increase in the world price of good D, and a decline 
in the world price of good X. If there is no change in the world input price, the terms of 
trade effect of trade liberalization is expected to be negative.  
The fourth term in the second square brackets captures the allocation effect on the 
demand side. A tariff cut has a positive effect on welfare since it increases the consumption 
of good D by reducing its consumption price and there is under-consumption of good D in 
the initial equilibrium. If the world price of good D increases as a result of the increased 
imports of D, the consumption price of good D may rise leading to a decline in the 
consumption of good D. This will be welfare reducing. The net effect is ambiguous. 
The last two terms in the second square brackets depict the resource allocation 
effect of a tariff cut. It is unambiguously positive if the tariff cut increases the price of 
value added in the negatively protected export sector X, and decreases the price of value 
added in the protected domestic sector D. 
In the small country case, equation (D) transforms into (D’): 
dt p e R p e R E
dt p e R p e R p a
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The term in the second square brackets is the welfare effect of a tariff cut on good D. It is 
unambiguously welfare improving. The tariff cut means that the protected sector D   20
contracts relative to sector X, and the consumption of good D increases as its price falls 
down. Both changes are welfare improving. A comparison of expressions (D’) and (C’) 
suggests that in a small economy liberalizing both final and intermediate input markets is 
more likely to be welfare enhancing than liberalizing intermediate input markets only.  
The welfare effect of liberalizing both intermediate and final goods is 
unambiguously positive if the country produces only two goods and in the initial 
equilibrium  X X D D D p a a p a / ) ) 1 /(( < + − φ φ . The latter is more likely to be true for lower 
duty drawback and higher intensity of import use in the export oriented sector.
24 
Proposition 3. The welfare effect of liberalizing both intermediate and final goods is 
ambiguous. In a small economy liberalizing both final and intermediate input markets is 
more likely to be welfare enhancing than liberalizing intermediate input markets only. In 
such an economy producing only goods D and X the welfare effect is unambiguously 
positive if  X X D D D p a a p a / ) ) 1 /(( < + − φ φ  in the initial equilibrium. This is more likely to be 
true for lower duty drawback and higher intensity of import use in the export oriented 
sector in equilibrium. 
An introduction (removal) of a duty drawback may lead to additional government 
expenditures (savings) because the administration of a nationwide duty drawback system 
can be costly and the duty drawback system can be misused leading to leakages in the tariff 
collection system. These savings (costs) also need to be taken into account when 
estimating the welfare effect of a duty drawback reform. The lower these costs (savings) 
the more likely it is that the welfare effect of introducing (removing) a duty drawback will 
be positive (negative).   
                                                 
24 See section 2.2 for an explanation.   21
The model in this section is useful for building intuition about the expected welfare 
outcomes under different policy scenarios. However, it is impossible to determine the 
direction and magnitude of welfare change without an empirical model. Furthermore, as 
we show in the case of China the policy concerns go beyond aggregate welfare and are 
about export competitiveness, sector employment and output, trade and investment flows, 
domestic value-added, and real factor returns. The applied multi-region, multi-sector 
model presented next can be used to estimate these effects. 
 
3. The empirical model  
The empirical model estimates the impact of duty drawback and trade reform on sector 
employment, exports, imports and output; prices, factor returns; tax revenue and household 
welfare. We relax a number of the assumptions in section 2. We increase the number of 
sectors to capture changes in sector employment, output, and trade. We increase the 
number of regions to keep track of changes in bilateral trade balances. We no longer 
assume that producers use only imported intermediate and factor inputs. Instead producers 
use also domestic intermediate inputs that are substitutes for the imported intermediate 
inputs. This allows us to capture the effect of duty drawback and trade reform on domestic 
value added. We assume that trade and output/export taxes are not the only distortions in 
the economy, but that there are also factor input taxes, consumption taxes, taxes on 
domestic and imported intermediate inputs, and others. We no longer assume that the value 
added is a linear homogenous function and transport costs are zero.  
As before production for export and domestic markets is completely separated. The 
choice to fully separate domestic and export production simplifies considerably the 
representation of duty drawbacks in a large empirical multi-region, multi-sector model. It   22
allows the domestic and export-oriented production activities to use different input 
mixes,
25 and is an accurate depiction of the dual market structure in China with partially 
segmented domestic and export markets. 
The empirical model represents a world with R economies in which there are G 
perfectly competitive industries – each using a constant-returns-to-scale technology, F 
types of production factors, G types of domestic and imported intermediates. The G 
industries produce G types of goods.
26 Each industry has a sector D producing only for the 
domestic market, and a sector X producing for export only.  
The production functions are Leontief so efficiency implies that: 
, / Ω Ω Ω = = Ω ijr ijr jr jr a I V         ( 1 )  
where  } ,..., 1 { }, ,..., 1 { , R r G j i ∈ ∈ , superscript } , { X D ∈ Ω  indicates the type of the sector, 
Ω
jr V  is the value-added of sector Ω in industry j of region r, 
Ω
ijr I  is the intermediate input 
demand for input i in industry j of region r, and 
Ω
ijr a  is the fixed intermediate input-output 
coefficient for good i in sector Ω of industry j in region r. 
Producers minimize unit factor costs given the vector of factor prices  F
fr p  and 
relevant taxes  F
fr t , and a CES function that relates the level of output to the factor inputs. 
Linear homogeneity of the production function implies that factor demands of sector Ω in 
industry j of region r  ( Ω
fjr F ) can be written as: 





fjr fjr t p a V F
jr
Ω Ω Ω =                        (2) 
where superscript F stands for factor use,  } ,..., 1 { F f ∈ .  
                                                 
25 Duty drawbacks lower the cost of imported intermediates encouraging their use. This implies that the 
intensity of imported intermediate use by the export sector is typically higher than the intensity of imported 
intermediate use by the sector producing for the local market. 
26 There is a one-to-one correspondence between goods and industries.   23
Primary factors are fully employed. Their supply is exogenous and equals demand 
in equilibrium: 





fjr fr F F                                    (3) 
The domestic and foreign intermediate inputs are imperfect substitutes in a 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) composite function (Armington 1969).
27 Imports 
of good i in region r for the production of goods sold domestically and for exports are CES 
composites of imports from various sources s,  Ω
isr M .
28 Product differentiation among 
imports by region of origin allows for two-way trade in each product category, depending 
on the ease of substitution between products from different sources. 
In equilibrium, output of good i from the domestic-oriented sector in an industry 
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) ( .                      (4) 
Output of good i from the export-oriented sector in an industry in region r meets import 
demand of all trading partners: 





irs ir M X                         (5)  
  Competitive producers in both the export-oriented and domestic-oriented sectors 
earn zero profit in equilibrium: 
   , ) 1 )( , ( ) 1 ( ∑ ∑















fir ir t p p p a t p a p              (6) 
                                                 
27 This is a standard assumption in this type of applied multi-region CGE models. 
28 Subscript s stands for ‘source’ region, while subscript r stands for ‘destination’ region.   24
where  Ω
jr p  is the supply price to market  } , { X D ∈ Ω ; 
Ω I
jir p  – the composite demand price of 
good j for intermediate use by sector Ω of industry i in region r is a function of  D
jr p  – the 
domestic supply price of good j in region r, and  Ω M
jr p  – the import price of good j used for 
final consumption or as intermediate input by sector Ω in region r; 
Ω I
jir t  is the tax on 
intermediate inputs.  
In equilibrium, the domestic cif  price equals the fob price gross of export tax, the 
applicable tariff, and transport costs: 
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ir t t p a p τ φ + − + + =∑                (8) 
where  M
isr t  is the import tax on good i from region s to region r;  X
isr t is the export tax on 
good i from region s to region r;  isr τ is the transportation cost of good i from region s to 
region r; and φ  is the parameter determining the extent of the duty drawback.  
The model’s equations (1) through (8) show that duty drawbacks improve the 
exporters’ competitiveness as their costs either do not reflect import duties or reflect 
reduced import taxes due to partial duty rebates. Duty drawbacks provide incentives for 
increased production and employment in the export-oriented sectors and for increased use 
of imported rather than domestic intermediate inputs thereby creating conditions for 
shallow domestic supply chains. 
In this model we assume that tariffs are exogenous. In general, this assumption can 
be relaxed by endogenizing tariffs, assuming that the government values welfare as well as 
lobbying contributions, and calibrating the share of population politically organized as   25
capitalist in each sector.
29 Since it is unclear to what extent China values lobbying from 
business interests when setting its tariffs,
30 we keep tariffs exogenous, but vary them to see 
the impact of changes in tariffs for a given duty drawback policy. 
One of the industries produces a non-tradable investment good using both domestic 
and imported capital goods. This investment good can be installed either in a domestic or 
an export-oriented sector. Since capital goods brought into China for export processing by 
foreign-invested enterprises have been exempt from import duties during most of the 
1990s, we assume that the imported investment goods installed in the export-oriented 
sectors of China are duty exempt.  
In the background we assume that in each economy there is a single representative 
consumer, maximizing a constant-difference-elasticity (CDE) demand system.
31 The 
representative consumers and the government receive income from payments of primary 
factor services and tax revenue net of the costs of any duty drawback scheme and subsidy 
programs, respectively, and save a fixed share of their income. Public consumption is 
governed by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. As in the case of intermediate inputs, both 
private and government final demands are a CES composite of domestic and imported 
products. The consumer price level is the numeraire, and aggregate investment is such that 




                                                 
29 This is the method proposed by Cadot et al. (2004). 
30 The discussion in section 4 suggests that China’s trade policies aimed at correcting the anti-export bias, 
increasing employment and incomes, diversifying the production base, increasing foreign exchange proceeds 
and investment. 
31 The CDE implicit expenditure function, proposed by Hanoch (1975), is less restrictive than other 
functional forms in that the elasticities of substitution between pairs of commodities can differ and income 
elasticities are not restricted to equal one.  
32 The assumption of fixed trade balance as a share of GDP is required when evaluating welfare impacts 
using a static global empirical model.    26
4. Are duty drawbacks worth the hassle? The case of China 
This section analyzes reform options for China’s post-WTO trading system. We start with 
a description of China’s duty drawback system, followed by a specification of the data and 
simulation design, and finally a discussion of the results. 
 
4.1 China’s duty drawback system 
Duty drawbacks in the form of tariff exemptions have been a central feature of China’s 
export processing system. Introduced in 1979 in order to improve the country’s 
competitiveness by reducing the anti-export bias in the country’s economic climate,
33 
initially the system provided various incentives for both the processing of raw materials for 
export and the assembly of imported parts and components to produce finished goods for 
export (known as processing and assembling or processing with supplied materials). In 
1986-87 these incentives were expanded to allow for duty-free imports of all raw materials 
and intermediate inputs used in the production of exports,
34 and later to imported capital 
                                                 
33 In the pre-reform era exchange rates, tariffs and relative prices had little influence on the magnitude and 
commodity composition of China’s foreign trade. Firms producing for export sold their products to foreign 
trade companies at officially established domestic prices, fixed in domestic currency. Export producers did 
not get the foreign exchange income from the sale of their products on international markets and thus had 
little incentive to expand production of goods for which foreign demand was strong (Lardy, 2002). The 
prices of imports also distorted the distribution of resources in the economy. Approximately 80 percent of 
imports were sold in China at prices similar to those of comparable products, quoted in domestic currency, 
and adjusted up or down to reflect quality differences. This price setting process isolated domestic firms from 
the influence of relative domestic and international price changes on the import pattern and from exchange 
rate changes. For imports without domestic equivalents, which accounted for 20 percent of all imports, 
domestic prices were based on the cost of imports converted to domestic currency at the official exchange 
rate. Since this exchange rate was overvalued, the imports were in effect subsidized. The consequences of 
these policies were (1) lack of foreign exchange for imports due to low exports; (2) low growth in trade 
volume; (3) distorted commodity composition of foreign trade, particularly on the export side, which did not 
correspond to China’s comparative advantage in the production of  labor intensive goods. 
34 Companies involved in export processing benefited from other tax concessions such as value-added tax 
(VAT) exemptions on imported goods. Benefits differed depending on the location of the company and were 
greatest for companies located, for instance,  in bonded areas and EPZs. Benefits in these areas included not 
only tariff and other tax exemptions, but also speedy customs processing, good infrastructure and others. 
Since these issues are not the primary focus of the paper, they are omitted from further discussion.    27
goods supplied by foreign firms to Chinese companies when the equipment was needed to 
fulfill processing contracts.
35 
  On the eve of accession (2000), export processing trade accounted for 41 percent of 
imports and 55 percent of exports in China. The remaining 45 percent of exports, called 
ordinary exports, were produced mainly with domestic inputs and only a small portion of 
duty–paid imported materials.
36 According to the Customs authorities, in 2000, 60 percent 
of imports entered China duty-free, out of which 41 percentage points were imports used 
for export processing, 13 percentage points were capital goods, and 6 percentage points 
were goods that fell in special categories.
37  
 
4.1.1 Benefits associated with duty drawbacks in China 
Duty drawbacks in China reduced the anti-export bias of the old planned economic system 
and improved the competitiveness and efficiency of the economy by allowing export 
producers to import at international prices. In the absence of duty exemption schemes, 
exporters in China would have faced negative effective rates of protection (Figure 1 in 
Ianchovichina 2004). Duty drawbacks reduce the negative effective rates of protection 
(ERPs) for export competing firms, allowing many export producers to operate at world 
prices and compete more effectively in world markets. Duty drawbacks reduce the 
dispersion in ERPs (Table 2), and therefore increase economic efficiency (Bach and 
Martin, 2001). 
                                                 
35 China’s State Council decided to eliminate these exemptions as of April 1, 1996. However, this deadline 
was not strictly enforced and eventually the exemption program was formally re-established (Lardy, 2002). 
36 According to version 4 GTAP database (McDougall et al., 1998), in 1995 China’s firms exported on 
average 10 percent of their output and 14 percent of Chinese imports were for final consumption. According 
to China’s Customs 40 percent of imports were ordinary imports that were not duty exempt. Thus, 
approximately 26 percent were ordinary imports used as intermediates, implying that approximately less than 
3 percent of imports were used for the production of ordinary exports. 
37 These categories included materials used by research institutions and products used by the disabled when 
these products were unavailable in China.   28
Duty drawbacks boosted trade growth in China as they lowered the cost of 
imported inputs thus increasing export competitiveness. Right after their introduction in 
1979, processing trade comprised only 5 percent of Chinese trade flows. By 1988 
processing trade more than doubled. Between 1988 and 1991 processed exports produced 
with inputs purchased from abroad almost tripled, increasing from US$140 million in 1988 
to US$324 million in 1991 (Table 1), while total exports rose by 50 percent over the same 
period (World Bank, 1994). In 2000, processing trade accounted for 50 percent of total 
trade, with export processing accounting for 55 percent of total exports.
38   
Duty drawbacks facilitated China’s integration into the world production sharing 
system, which in turn speeded up the diversification of Chinese manufactured exports 
(Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004). Textile and garment producers pioneered export 
processing trade (Naughton, 2000), and despite the restrictive effect of the textile and 
apparel quotas in North America and Western Europe, made China the largest exporter of 
textiles and clothing in the world accounting for 8.8 percent of world textile exports and 
16.2 percent of world clothing exports in 1999. China later emerged as an important 
exporter of toys, sports goods, and more recently electronics, telecommunications and 
electrical equipment (Lardy, 2002).  
The boom in the export-oriented sector created millions of jobs.
39 It speeded up the 
transition of the Chinese economy from an agrarian to an industrial society and shaped 
China’s industrial composition to reflect the country’s comparative advantage in products 
that are intensive in its most abundant resource – low skilled labor.  
                                                 
38 These statistics are based on data for 2000 from Customs General Administration, People’s Republic of 
China.  
39 Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), China.   29
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was also affected positively as foreign-invested 
enterprises relocated production to China in order to take advantage of duty drawbacks and 
other benefits of the export processing regime. Zhang and Song (2000) provide evidence 
that inward FDI is the most important factor determining export performance in China and 
isolate duty drawbacks as the most fundamental factor explaining the expanding exports by 
foreign-invested enterprises. Estimates suggest that approximately 27 percent of actual FDI 
has gone to the export processing sectors.
40  
 
4.1.2 Problems with China’s duty drawback system 
Duty drawbacks are commonly associated with leakages in the tariff collection system, 
fraud related to misuses of the duty drawback system, high administrative costs, trade 
imbalances, and exports with low domestic value-added. Next we discuss whether these 
issues have been pronounced in China.  
Tariff collection rates in China have stayed low for more than two decades (1981-
2000) (Table 1). At its peak the tariff collection rate was slightly above 16 percent, at its 
lowest it was close to 2 percent. Throughout the period the average, statutory tariff rate 
was much higher than the tariff collection rate (Table 1). The large discrepancy between 
statutory and actual tariff collection rates could be attributed mainly to the rising share of 
duty-free imports in total imports (Table 1), and less to fraudulent uses of duty drawbacks. 
The share of imports subject to any import duty in China has declined with the growth in 
export processing activities. In 2000, when only 40 percent of imports were subject to any 
tariff, the effective average tariff rate was 6.8 percent, just 2.8 percentage points higher 
                                                 
40 This estimate is based on the following estimates by the Beijing office of BNP Paribus Peregrine Securities 
Limited for 2000: 54 percent of committed FDI when to the manufacturing sector, 50 percent of FDI in 
manufactures was for export processing, the delivery ratio was 52 percent (i.e. the actual FDI was 52 percent 
of the committed FDI).   30
than the actual tariff collection rate of 4 percent.
41 These numbers suggest that in 2000 the 
leakage in the tariff collection system associated with export-related fraud was not larger 
than US$63 million or 2.8 percent of total imports. Since by 2007 the simple average tariff 
will fall to 9.8%, the leakage in the tariff collection system is expected to be negligible.  
The costs of administering China’s duty drawback system have been modest. 
According to China’s General Administration of Custom, there were 40,000 Customs 
employees in 2001. Approximately 3,000 Customs employees were involved in visiting 
production facilities, registering and processing export processing contracts. In addition, 
there were officials who investigated various violations of the export processing trade 
rules. These numbers suggest that around 10 percent of the total Customs’ labor force 
monitored processing trade. Assuming that customs officers received the average 
government wage,
42 the cost of duty exemption administration in 2001 is estimated at 
48,568,000 Yuan or US$5.9 million.  
Despite the low administrative costs and leakages in the tariff collection system 
associated with export processing trade, China’s duty drawback system is not without 
problems. The export processing system has led to a highly concentrated export market for 
Chinese products. China’s imports for processing trade come mainly from other parts of 
East Asia, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, while its exports go 
predominantly to the United States, the European Union, and Japan.
43 Among all its 
trading partners the largest US trade deficit is with China ($US113 billion in 2002).
44 It 
accounts for approximately 20 percent of the total US trade deficit. Naughton (2000) 
                                                 
41 Tariff collection rates were lower than 3 percent between 1994 and 1998. In 1999 they jumped to slightly 
more than 4 percent as a result of the government’s anti-smuggling efforts and the policy of encouraging 
domestic demand through government spending. 
42 According to China Statistical Yearbook (2002) the average government wage in 2001 was 12,142 Yuan. 
43 Lardy (2002) reports China’s trade surplus with the United States to be around US$69 billion. 
44 Source: WITS/COMTRADE.   31
estimates that the huge U.S. deficit with China under export processing trade overwhelms 
the tiny U.S. surplus with China under ordinary trade. With WTO accession these trade 
imbalances might deepen, leading to an escalation in trade-related tensions with the United 
States, and increasing the chances of anti-dumping cases filed against China in the coming 
years.
45  
Perhaps the most serious concern is that the duty exemption system has created 
incentives for growth in exports with little domestic value-added and low profit margins. 
Protection of the domestic market raises the prices of non-tradeables and tradeables with 
high domestic content. This discourages the use of domestic raw materials and products, 
and implies that the domestic sector is not competitive by international standards. 
Furthermore, companies involved in export processing are typically part of 
production networks (Borrus et al., 2000). They import intermediates from parent firms in 
Asian countries or buy from their affiliates on the Mainland (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 
2004), while high value added functions such as research, design, and marketing are 
carried out in developed countries.
46 
The share of in-China value-added in 1992 was only 20 percent or less of the value 
of processed exports (Naughton, 2000). This is not surprising since duty and other tax 
drawbacks, local content requirements and foreign balancing rules
47 discouraged domestic 
                                                 
45 U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC) report on antidumping and countervailing duty orders in 
place as of February 4, 2004 suggests that antidumping orders against China have increased after 2002. There 
were 6 anti-dumping orders filed in 2003. With the exception of 1991, when USITC filed 7 anti-dumping 
cases against China, this is the largest number of such cases against China filed by USITC in any single year 
since 1983, (http://www.usitc.gov/).  
46 The case of the hard disk drives (HDD) produced by Seagate’s Wuxi facility is a good example. The value-
added within China, including wages, overhead, and a portion of transport costs is estimated to be at most 10 
percent of the total value of the HDD. Most of the value of the HDD comes from research, design, marketing, 
management of supply chains, and other processes, which are primarily done in the United States 
(Gourevitch et al. 1997). 
47 Foreign balancing rules required companies selling domestically to source 70 to 80 percent of 
intermediates from domestic producers and to finance imports by selling exports.   32
companies selling locally from using imported intermediates. Complex administrative 
rules discouraged export processing companies from selling locally.
48  
The share of domestic value-added has risen since then to more than 30% in 2000 
partly because the share of profit margins and/or wage costs may have increased more 
rapidly than the costs of imported inputs. But also because of the growing integration of 
the production process in China, where the value-add chain now includes packaging and 
marketing, which were previously carried out in Hong Kong, and the shift in processing 
activities toward machinery, which has higher local content than textiles and electronics.  
However, Maruya (2000) provides evidence that the increased local content is due 
to a rise in transactions among foreign affiliates located in China and that procurement 
from Chinese companies has remained low. Some of the reasons explaining the weak 
linkages between the export and domestic-oriented sectors are the higher quality of 
imported intermediates, the tighter delivery schedules of foreign suppliers, the difficult 
access of foreign firms to local primary products (agricultural goods and raw materials). 
Dual market structure and the constraints to private sector growth
49 may have slowed down 
the technological upgrading of domestic companies (Lemoine and Ünal-Kesenci, 2004).  
 
4.2 Reform options for China’s post-WTO trading system  
China’s compliance with its WTO commitments will unify to a large degree export and 
domestic markets. By 2007 weighted average statutory tariffs on manufactures will fall to 
6.9% (Table 2). Competition in the domestic market will intensify and economic efficiency 
                                                 
48  Failure to obtain in advance a license to sell domestically was considered smuggling. Granting the 
permission required the involvement of a number of government agencies. Naughton (2000) compared 
China’s trading system to that of Thailand and assessed the degree of dualism in China to be greater than that 
in Thailand because of the greater importance of government bureaucratic interference in China. 
49 Huang (2003) argues that legal discrimination and limited access to bank credit constrained the growth of 
local firms.   33
will increase with the fall in protection. The dualism of the market structure will be further 
reduced with the abolition of the complex trading rights system,
50 local content 
requirements, and foreign balancing rules.  
China’s WTO accession commitments do not require the duty drawback removal,
51 
yet given the fall in statutory tariffs and the negative aspects associated with the drawback 
system, it becomes important to assess ways of unifying the country’s tariff structure. One 
way to accomplish this will be to remove duty drawbacks after 2007. An alternative way 
will be to remove tariffs on manufactured imports thus making duty drawbacks irrelevant. 
Yet another alternative is to abolish duty drawbacks and halve tariffs on manufactures.  
We use the empirical multi-region, multi-sector general equilibrium model in 
section 3 to provide answers to some of these questions.  The results however should be 
interpreted with caution. They are not predictions but are estimates reflecting the model’s 
assumptions and the key forces driving the outcomes.     
 
4.2.1 Data and simulation design 
The starting point for the numerical simulations is the modified GTAP version 5 database 
in Ianchovichina and Martin (2004). This database is aggregated to 20 regions, 25 sectors 
and 5 factor inputs and is changed to reflect the presence of duty drawbacks.
52 The 
database also reflects growth in the world economy to 2007
53 and the implementation of 
                                                 
50 China has agreed to terminate limitations on trading rights upon WTO accession, and in the case of 
designated trading over a 5 year period. 
51 WTO explicitly allows duty drawbacks/exemptions for use in the production of export up to the value of 
the liable duty. 
52 Ianchovichina (2004) discusses in detail the implementation of the empirical model in GEMPACK 
(Harrison and Pearson, 1996) and the changes to the GTAP data necessary to incorporate duty drawbacks. 
53 The growth projections are based on World Bank projections for aggregate real GDP and factor input 
growth in each region in the model and a residually determined total factor productivity growth rate to ensure 
consistency between the two. These projection rates are shown in Table 4 of Ianchovichina and Martin   34
China’s WTO accession commitments.
54 This is important since all post-WTO reform 
options are evaluated on the background of the implemented WTO commitments. For 
comparison purposes we use the same set of elasticities and tax distortions as in 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) (Table 4A). These originally come from GTAP version 5 
database (Dimaranan and McDougall 2002).  
The macro closure for the empirical model is one of full employment, perfect 
mobility of skilled and unskilled workers between nonagricultural sectors, and perfect 
mobility of unskilled workers within agriculture. However, there are barriers to labor 
mobility between rural and urban employment (see Ianchovichina and Martin, 2004). To 
capture the effects of these barriers to mobility, the model allows for both imperfect 
transformation between unskilled workers in agricultural and unskilled nonagricultural 
employment, and an implicit tax on nonagricultural employment. The imperfect 
transformation reflects the substantial differences in farm and nonfarm unskilled workers’ 
characteristics, and the ability to transform at a cost farm into nonfarm workers through 
training, experience, and the creation of nonfarm jobs in rural areas.
55 The tax is designed 
to reflect the pure policy-induced barriers between rural and urban workers, such as the 




                                                                                                                                                    
(2004), available also as a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/26864_wps3053.pdf. 
54 China’s WTO accession commitments include reduction in protection to post-accession (2007) tariff 
levels, liberalization of the services sectors, restructuring of the automobile sector, removal of quotas on 
China’s clothing and textile exports, and China’s agricultural export subsidies.   
55 We set the elasticity of transformation at 1.32. This is the estimate by Sicular and Zhao (2002) used in 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004). 
56 The tax reflecting pure policy-induced barriers between rural and urban wages is set at 34 percent. This is 
the estimate by Shi (2001) used in Ianchovichina and Martin (2004). Even though the government recently 
removed the requirement for a residence permit in urban areas, in practice migrant workers in urban areas 
still need to incur the costs of health care and schooling for children in urban areas.    35
4.2.2 Impact of duty drawback removal in China  
Duty drawback removal after implementing China’s WTO accession commitments has a 
small positive effect on welfare in China (Table 3).
57 Aggregate welfare increases by 
US$3.8 billion per year due to an improvement in China’s terms of trade. The decline in 
export supply puts an upward pressure on China’s export prices and the world prices of 
China’s biggest export items (e.g. apparel and textiles, and light manufactures) and a 
downward pressure on China’s import prices (Table 4B).  
Efficiency losses diminish the positive terms-of-trade effect (Table 3). The export-
oriented sectors contract because they no longer benefit from the duty drawback. The 
domestic sectors’ expand absorbing the workers who leave their export processing jobs. 
This is welfare reducing since even with duty drawbacks the export-oriented sectors have 
negative ERPs, reflecting the sectors’ tax burden and protection on domestic intermediate 
inputs, while the domestic sectors have positive ERPs (Table 2). A small welfare loss is 
associated with the contraction of the export processing sectors as they are primarily 
manufacturing sectors, which in China face higher employment-related taxes than other 
sectors (e.g. agriculture).
58  
The direction of the allocation effect is consistent with the predictions of the model 
in section 2. There we show that the resource allocation effect of duty drawback removal is 
unambiguously negative when the expanding domestic sector’s ERP is positive and the 
contracting export-oriented sector’s ERP is negative.  
The welfare gain from the duty drawback removal may be smaller than US$3.8 
billion. First, Bach and Martin (2001) show that the increased dispersion in ERPs 
                                                 
57 Remembering the notation of sections 2 and 3, we change φ  from 1 to 0 implying that the export-oriented 
sectors must pay post-WTO statutory tariffs (Table 2). 
58 Employment taxes in non-farm industries of 34% reflect the cost of a residence permit and the inability to 
sell farm land.    36
augments economic efficiency losses. Second, the empirical model with Armington 
structure may overstate the terms of trade effect (Brown, 1987).
59 Although China is a 
large producer and exporter of some manufactured products, it is unlikely that it will have 
market power to lift its export prices to the extent represented in the model.
60 Intense 
competition in world markets for China’s most important exports – apparel, toys and other 
light manufactures implies small price changes and quick supply responses.  
In order to illustrate the impact of increased competition on the terms of trade we 
double the elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported goods, and between 
imports from different regions.
61 As a result the welfare gain drops to US$2.6 billion, 
mainly because of a much smaller export price effect (US$3.8 billion), and a larger 
negative resource allocation effect (US$2.3 billion). The resource allocation effect is large 
since the higher substitutability between products suggests larger export and import 
quantity changes. In the case of perfect substitution between domestic and imported goods, 
and between imports from different regions we expect to see the terms of trade gains 
further eroded
62 and the welfare gain reduced to zero.   
While duty drawbacks removal will not affect negatively aggregate welfare, it will 
hurt China’s competitiveness and exports (Table 4A). The volume of total exports decline 
by 6% and sectors in which export processing is important contract with  the higher input 
                                                 
59 While Brown and others make the point that in Armington-type models with national product 
differentiation the terms of trade effects tend to dominate the welfare results,  Francois and Shiells (1994) 
argue in favor of the Armington assumption in empirical trade models. They show that the Armington and 
monopolistic competition specifications are identical if the number of domestic and foreign product varieties 
is unchanged in equilibrium, allowing for free entry and exit.  
60 See the export price component of the terms of trade effect (US$4.1 billion) in Table 4B. 
61 This implies reduced degree of product differentiation between imports and domestic goods, and imports 
by country of origin. 
62 We showed in section 2.1 that in this case the terms of trade effect will be captured by the first three terms 
of expression (B).   37
costs. Exports of automobiles decline by 38%,  plant-based fibers – 17%,
63 beverages – 
11%, textiles – 7%, apparel by – 7%, electronics – 5 %, light manufacturing – 4% (Table 
4A).  
Despite the decline in export volumes real output remains almost unchanged (-.1%) 
as domestic supply chains deepen and the domestic-oriented industries expand (0.8%) 
(Table 4A). Domestic sales increase as consumers and manufacturing sectors increase their 
demand for domestic manufactured final and intermediate products.
64   
Demand for labor in the export processing industries declines driving real wages of 
unskilled and skilled nonfarm workers down by 0.3% (Table 4A). Skilled and unskilled 
workers are absorbed by the industries producing for the domestic market. The policy 
change will not threaten China’s rural poor. Real wages of unskilled farm workers remain 
unchanged while real land rents rise by 1%.
65  
The fiscal impact of the reform is positive. Tariff revenue as a share of income rises 
by 25%, while tax revenue grows by 1.3%. The removal of duty drawbacks will lead to a 
decline in the bilateral trade surplus with North America of around US$7 billion or 6 
percent.





                                                 
63 The negative impact on exports of plant based fibers illustrates the importance of production sharing in the 
region. 
64 The contraction of the export processing sectors and the expansion of the domestic industries are amplified 
in the case of reduced product differentiation between domestic and imported products. See Appendix Table 
1. 
65 These results are robust to changes in the elasticities of substitution (see Appendix Table 1). 
66 These results do not change much for larger elasticities of substitution (see Table 3). 
67 China’s trade-related tensions with the US are  expected to intensify in the post-WTO period. 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) estimate that the bilateral trade surplus with the United States will increase 
by 10 percent due to reforms associated with China’s entry into the WTO and scheduled to take place 
between 2001 and 2007.   38
4.2.3 Impact of completely liberalizing China’s  manufacturing sector 
Complete liberalization of China’s manufacturing sectors
68,69 leads to a welfare loss of 
US$4.8 billion, mainly because the terms of trade loss of US$8.8 billion a year is nearly 
twice the efficiency gain of the reform (Table 3). The latter as shown in equation (D) is 
associated with a contraction of the protected domestic-oriented sector, an increase in final 
import consumption due to lower import prices and an expansion of the export-oriented 
sectors.
70 Increasing the substitutability between Chinese and other countries’ products 
reduces the welfare loss mainly because in this case China’s export and import expansions 
are stronger, while the decline in China’s export prices is smaller.
71  The terms of trade 
loss may be smaller than US$8.8 billion because liberalization will encourage not only the 
export expansion of existing varieties but also the emergence of new varieties (Martin and 
Manole, 2004). 
Domestic consumer prices fall (-1.5%) and exports expand (8.9%) as export 
production costs decline (Table 5). Real GDP remains almost unchanged (0.1%) because 
the domestic-oriented sector and domestic intermediate input use contract due to 
competition from imports (Table 5). The negative effect on the output of firms producing 
                                                 
68 We remove tariffs only on manufactured imports that are subject to heavy duty drawback use (Table 2). 
Tariffs in the agro-processing industries (processed food, beverages and tobacco) and the industries involved 
in natural resource extraction are left unchanged. These industries are not heavy users of imported 
intermediates (Ianchovichina, 2004), and tariffs in the extraction sector are low.  
69 Since the data do not distinguish between imported goods for intermediate use and final use at the border, 
we in effect reduce tariffs on both thus liberalizing completely trade in manufactured goods. Remembering 
the notation in section 2 we change t and t
M to zero and the discussion in section 2.3 applies.
  
70 Even with duty drawbacks the export-oriented sectors face negative effective rates of protection (Table 2). 
71 With a decline in product differentiation by source the demand curve for Chinese exports flattens. This 
implies smaller price changes and larger quantity changes than in the case of higher degree of product 
differentiation.    39
automobiles will be particularly strong since the motor vehicles’ sector will enjoy the 
highest tariffs on manufactured products after 2007.
72 
The export and farm sectors absorb the workers freed by firms serving the domestic 
market. Real wages and rents rise since the decline in nominal wages will be more than 
offset by the decline in domestic consumer prices. The reform will be beneficial to the poor 
because the unskilled workers’ real wages rise more than real wages of skilled workers, 
with real wages of unskilled farm workers and land rents rising the most (Table 5).
73    
The fiscal impact of the reform is insignificant (Table 3). Although tariff revenue as 
a share of income declines by 92%, tax revenue as a share of income declines by just 4.6%. 
The decline in tariff revenue is offset by an increase in tax collection revenue as 
liberalization boosts economic activity in China. The bilateral trade surplus with North 
America increases by 12 percent.  
 
4.2.4 Impact of removing duty drawbacks and halving tariffs on manufactures in China 
Unifying China’s tariff structure by eliminating duty drawbacks and halving tariff rates on 
manufactures offers a compromise in which the outcomes are a combination of the results 
in the previous two cases. China’s welfare measure rises by US$1 billion a year due to 
improved efficiency. The efficiency gains are a result of two forces acting in opposite 
directions. On one hand, the removal of duty drawbacks implies a contraction of the 
export-oriented sectors and an expansion of the domestic-oriented sectors. This reduces 
welfare. On the other hand, the reduction in tariffs implies an expansion of the export-
oriented sector and a contraction of the domestic-oriented sector. This enhances welfare.  
                                                 
72 Although qualitatively the results do not change, the domestic industries’ trade expansion and contraction 
are amplified with the decline in differentiation between domestic and imported products (see Appendix 
Table 2). 
73 These results are robust to changes in the elasticities of substitution (see Appendix Table 2).   40
A deterioration in the terms of trade reduces these efficiency gains. However, this 
decline is smaller than in the case of liberalizing manufactures since the duty drawback 
removal softens the fall in export prices. Increasing the substitutability between Chinese 
and other countries’ products amplifies the export and import expansion, and consequently 
the efficiency and welfare gains (Table 3).   
  Tariff revenue as a share of income falls by 25% - much  less than in the case of 
completely liberalizing manufactures since duty drawback removal accompanies the tariff 
cuts. Tax revenue drops by just 1.3% as liberalization boosts economic activity. China’s 
bilateral surplus with the US increases, but the increase is negligible since the export 
expansion following this reform is much more modest than the one following the complete 
liberalization of manufactures.  
The duty drawback removal creates incentives for producers to use domestic 
intermediate inputs, while the tariff cuts encourage them to purchase imported intermediate 
inputs. The net aggregate effect on domestic intermediate input use is negligible, with 
substantial variations by sector. The demand for domestically manufactured intermediate 
inputs of textiles, light manufacturing and electronics increases, but that of domestically 
produced auto parts and apparel declines since post-WTO protection on these product 
groups is high. The effect is negligible for metals and petrochemicals (Table 6).  
Exports of all sectors but motor vehicles expand as tariffs are halved. Duty 
drawback removal dampens this export expansion. Duty drawback removal has a negative 
impact on automobile exports because of the high intensity of imported input use and post-
reform protection in the sector.
74  
                                                 
74 The results for motor vehicles need to be interpreted with caution. The tariffs on autos are a combination of 
tariffs on auto components and cars. The tariffs on the latter are much higher than those on the former. This 
implies that the negative effect on car exports may not be as strong as the one portrayed here. Ideally we   41
 Real wages and rents rise since the decline in nominal factor prices is more than 
offset by a decline in domestic consumer prices. The reform does not harm the rural poor 
because real wages of unskilled farm workers rise more than those of unskilled non-farm 
workers. Real returns to farm land rise the most suggesting an overall improvement in 
returns to farming.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Several broad conclusions emerge from this analysis. An increase in the duty drawback has 
a positive impact on export competitiveness and employment in the export-oriented 
industries, but could lead to exports with low domestic value added. The welfare effects of 
duty drawback and trade reform are ambiguous. An increase in the drawback is more likely 
to be welfare enhancing if the economy is small with negative effective protection on the 
export processing activities and positive protection on the domestic-oriented activities, 
high input tariffs and intensity of imported input use in the export-oriented sectors, low 
initial drawback and low administrative costs and leakages in the tariff collection system. 
In such an economy liberalizing intermediate good markets can be welfare enhancing if the 
cost share of the imported input is higher in the export processing than in the import 
competing sector. This is more likely to be true for lower duty drawback and higher 
intensity of import use in the export-oriented sector. Liberalizing intermediate input 
markets is welfare reducing if there is a complete duty drawback in place.  
In China duty drawback removal after meeting its WTO commitments will deepen 
domestic supply chains and improve welfare, but will hurt China’s economic efficiency, 
output growth, export competitiveness in key manufacturing industries and real factor 
                                                                                                                                                    
should disaggregate components from vehicles. This however is a nontrivial task which requires a lot more 
data than currently available from the GTAP database.   42
incomes. Further reductions in statutory tariffs on manufactured goods could mitigate the 
negative effects. 
 A number of caveats are important. The paper offers a comparative static analysis 
of duty drawback and trade reforms, and therefore may miss potentially important dynamic 
effects. In the case of China, foreign direct investment rose as foreigners took advantage of 
drawbacks on both imported intermediate and capital goods used in the production of 
exports. Foreign investment and future growth in China may be negatively affected by the 
abolition of duty drawbacks and positively affected by the liberalization of the 
manufacturing sector. This suggests that we may have overestimated the welfare increases 
in the first and third scenarios and the welfare loss in the second scenario presented in 
section 4.
75 We have abstracted from quality differences between products, economies of 
scale and imperfect competition. The latter two could be significant both quantitatively and 
qualitatively (Harris, 1984). Implementing industrial organization features would have 
complicated the analytical analysis significantly, but in general one could implement these 
features in the empirical model. The level of aggregation in this paper hides important 
information on intra-industry trade. Furthermore, this paper does not capture explicitly the 
emergence of new products after introduction of a duty drawback. This would raise 
productivity as new activities enter the production possibilities, and reduce the drain on the 
terms of trade associated with the export expansion. Martin and Manole (2004) show that 




                                                 
75 For simplicity we use a static applied trade model in this paper. However, in general one can estimate the 
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 Table 1. China's processing trade,


















Year Tariff  rate
% 
1981 220 11 5.0  220 14 6.4  14.7  1982  55.6 
1982 223 15 6.7  193 20 10.4 13.3  1985  43.3 
1983 222 19 8.6 214 23 10.7  12.8  1988  43.7 
1984 261 29 11.1 274 30 10.9  16.6  1991  44.1 
1985 274 34 12.4 423 41 9.7 16.3  1992  42.9 
1986 309 56 18.1 429 67 15.6  10.1  1993  39.9 
1987 394 88 22.3 432 102 23.6 8.8  1994  36.3 
1988 475 140 29.5 553 147 26.6 7.5  1996  23.6 
1989 525 198 37.7 591 164 27.7 8.3  1997  17.6 
1990 621 255 41.1  533 187 35.1 6.2  2000  17.0 
1991 719 324 45.1 638 250 39.2 5.5  2001  16.6 
1992 849 396 46.6 806 315 39.1 4.8  2007  9.8 
1993 917 443 48.3 1040 364 35.0 4.3     
1994 1210 570 47.1 1156 476 41.2 2.8     
1995 1488 737 49.5 1321 584 44.2 2.6     
1996 1510 843 55.8 1388 623 44.9 2.6     
1997 1828 996 54.5 1424 702 49.3 2.7     
1998 1837 1045 56.9 1402 686 48.9 2.7     
1999 1949 1109 56.9 1657 736 44.4 4.1     
2000 2492 1376 55.2 2251 926 41.1 4.0     
*Source: General Administration of Customs, PRC (2000). Unless noted otherwise all numbers are in US$ 
million. The data for processing imports exclude the value of equipment provided by foreign firms to 
Chinese firms engaged in processing contracts.  These amounts in the latter half of the 1990s were usually 
between $1 billion and $1.5 billion annually. 
** Source: Lardy (2002) from 1982 to 1991 ; World Bank (1999, p.340) from 1992 to 1998; Ianchovichina 
and Martin (2004) from 1999 to 2007; post accession average tariff based on China’s final WTO offer. These 
tariff rates are calculated on an un-weighted basis. 
***Source: Lardy (2002). Tariff revenue is a percentage of the value of imports. 
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Table 2. China’s ERPs and statutory tariffs on manufactured imports in 2007  
  Effective Rates of Protection





















Textiles   18.5    -28.1  -18.2
***  8.9 0.0 4.5 
Apparel   33.5    -19.5  -12.4  14.9  0.0  7.5 
Light manufactures    62.3     -3.8  2.8 8.4 0.0 4.2 
Petrochemicals   19.7     -19.1  -13.4  7.1 0.0 3.6 
Metals   14.2     -21.9  -17.1  5.7 0.0 2.9 
Automobiles   41.7    -48.6  -11.0  13.8  0.0  6.9 
Electronics   -3.0     -14.7  -10.6  2.3 0.0 1.2 
Other manufactures    11.4     -15.7  -11.9  6.6 0.0 3.3 
Average -manufactures            6.9 0.0 3.5 
Dispersion in ERPs
****    29.0  (without  drawback)      
Dispersion in ERPs         23.7  (with  drawback)     
* Source: Author’s calculations using GTAP version 5 data base with post-accession protection from 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004).
  The protection for import competing firms is in general positive, while that 
for exporters is negative. This is because exporting firms face world prices while import-competing firms are 
protected by tariffs on imports (final or intermediates products).  
 
** These are weighted average statutory tariff rates (%). Source for post-accession protection: Ianchovichina 
and Martin (2004). 
*** The ERPs for export processing firms with duty drawbacks are negative because the domestic components 
of value added still have import duties embedded in them.  
**** Computed as standard deviations in ERPs by industry and sector (export/domestic). 
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halving tariffs on 
manufactured 
imports 
Terms of trade effect  5.5 (4.9)
*  -8.8 (-8.7)  -1.2 (-1.4) 
    (+) ∆ in world prices   0.6 (0.5)    -0.8 (-0.8)    0.0 (-0.1) 
    (+) ∆ in export prices   4.1 (3.8)    -6.4 (-6.3)    -0.9 (-1.0) 
    (-)  ∆ in import prices   -0.8 (-0.7)    1.6 (1.6)    0.3 (0.3) 
Efficiency allocation effect  -1.7 (-2.3)  4.0 (5.1)  2.2 (3.0) 
    (+) ∆ in factor employment    -0.2 (-0.2)    -0.1 (-0.2)    -0.2 (-0.2) 
    (+) ∆ in imports    -1.5 (-2.1)    4.1 (5.3)    2.4 (3.2) 
Total welfare gain (EV)  3.8 (2.6)  -4.8 (-3.6)  1.0 (1.6) 
Percentage change in:       
Tariff revenue as a share of income  25% (21%)  -92% (-92%)  -25% (-25%) 
Tax revenue as a share of income  1.3% (0.8%)  -4.6% (-4.6%)  -1.3% (-1.3%) 
Bilateral trade balance with the US  -6% (-8%)  12% (18%)  2% (4%) 
Source: Author’s simulations with the applied general equilibrium model in section 3. Savings due to 
reduced fraud related to export processing and customs administration costs are negligible (see section 4.1.2) 
and therefore are not included here. 
Note: All numbers in the tables are in 1997 US$ billion.  
* Numbers in parenthesis are results from simulations with the applied general equilibrium model in section 3 
and doubled elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported products, and imports by source.    50




















Rice 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 -0.7 4.4 
Wheat -2.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 -3.3 4.4 
Feedgrains -1.9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -2.7 4.4 
Vegetables and fruits  -0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.4 4.4 
Oilseeds -0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 -0.6 4.4 
Sugar 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 -0.9 4.4 
Plant based fibers  -17.0 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.2 -8.0 4.4 
Livestock & meat    -1.2 0.1 0 0.1 -0.1 8.1 5.0 
Dairy -1.4 2.6 2.5 2.7 2.5 -15.3 4.4 
Other food  -1.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 -2.0 4.4 
Beverages & tobacco  -10.5 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 -2.4 6.2 
Extractive industries  -3.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.0 5.6 
Textiles -7.3 4.2 1.3 1.4 4.1 -11.7 4.4 
Apparel -7.2 5.7 -4.6 -4.5 4.2 -8.5 8.8 
Light manufacturing  -4.4 6.8 -0.2 -0.1 6.4 -18.7 8.8 
Petrochemical industry  -2.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8 -4.0 4.1 
Metals -1.3 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.8 -5.9 5.6 
Autos -37.9 1.7 -16 -14.7 1.7 -17.8 10.4 
Electronics -4.8 1.7 -1.8 -1.8 1.6 -3.7 5.6 
Other manufactures  -3.3 1.0 -0.1 -0.2 1.0 -5.1 5.5 
Trade and transport  -2.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 -1.8 3.8 
Construction 1.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -1.7 3.8 
Communication 1.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -2.3 3.8 
Commercial services  2.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 -2.1 3.8 
Other services  0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 -2.0 4.0 
Total -5.6 0.8 -0.1 0.0 0.7 -5.7
Unskilled wages
*        -0.2  Unskilled non-farm wage  -0.3  Land rent  1.0 
Skilled wage        -0.3          Unskilled farm wage  0  Capital rent  -0.5 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3.  
*All wages and rents are given in real terms, i.e. these are percentage changes in wages relative to the CPI.  51



























Rice  -0.4  0.0 -0.2  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Wheat  -0.1  -0.1 0.2  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Feedgrains  -0.1  0.0  0.3  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Vegetables and fruits  -0.3  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.00  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Oilseeds  -0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.01  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sugar  -0.2  0.0 -0.1  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Plant based fibers  -0.1  -0.1  1.9  -0.1  0.00  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Livestock & meat    -0.3  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.00  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Dairy  -0.2  -0.1 0.1  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other  food  -0.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.00  0.000 0.002 0.000 
Beverages & tobacco  -0.3  0.0  1.1  -0.1  -0.04  0.000  0.005  -0.002 
Extractive  industries  -0.1  -0.1 0.3  -0.1  -0.07  0.004 0.000 0.000 
Textiles -0.3  0.2  1.3  -0.1  -0.05  -0.007  0.085  -0.037 
Apparel -0.3  0.6  1.1  0.0  0.13  0.074  0.087  -0.016 
Light manufacturing  -0.4  0.2  0.6  -0.1  0.05  0.013  0.024  -0.005 
Petrochemical industry  -0.4  0.0  0.3  -0.1  -0.09  0.003  0.023  -0.013 
Metals -0.5  -0.1  0.1  -0.1  -0.03  0.001  0.006  -0.006 
Autos -0.4  0.1  5.8  -0.1  0.00  -0.001  0.187  -0.008 
Electronics -0.3  0.0  0.5  -0.1  0.01  0.000  0.069  -0.010 
Other manufactures  -0.5  0.0  0.3  -0.1  0.09  -0.003  0.101  -0.018 
Trade and transport  -0.6  -0.1  0.2  -0.1  0.02  0.003  0.018  -0.001 
Construction  -0.6  -0.1 -0.2  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Communication  -0.7  -0.1 -0.2  -0.1  0.00  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Commercial services  -0.7  -0.1  -0.3  -0.1  0.00  0.000  -0.002  0.000 
Other  services  -0.6  -0.1 -0.1  -0.1  -0.01  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Total -0.4  0  0.7  -0.1    0.087  0.605  -0.116 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3.  
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Rice 4.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 -3.3 -0.7
Wheat 2.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 -0.9 -0.4
Feedgrains 2.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -1.7 -0.1
Vegetables and fruits  3.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 -2.6 -0.7
Oilseeds 2.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 -0.1 -0.3
Sugar 3.5 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.4 -1.3 -0.5
Plant based fibers  8.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 -1.9 -0.8
Livestock & meat    4.4 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -2.9 -0.5
Dairy 4.6 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 0.8 -0.5
Other food  5.3 0.5 1.1 1.2 0.5 -2.9 -0.6
Beverages & tobacco  9.3 3.0 3.6 3.5 1.0 -3.7 -0.5
Extractive industries  7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.2 -0.9
Textiles 8.2 -2.5 0.2 0.0 -2.0 5.9 -4.8
Apparel 8.9 -35.4 -0.1 -0.6 -8.1 53.9 -7.9
Light manufacturing  8.2 -6.0 2.8 2.6 -0.6 21.1 -3.8
Petrochemical industry  7.8 -2.8 -2.0 -2.1 -2.6 13.7 -2.1
Metals 12.0 -2.6 -1.2 -1.2 -2.6 14.0 -1.8
Autos 5.8 -14.9 -5.7 -6.3 -14.8 15.8 -5.9
Electronics 9.0 4.3 6.9 6.8 4.4 2.5 -1.9
Other manufactures  10.5 -3.5 0.1 0.0 -3.3 16.9 -2.2
Trade and transport  6.2 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.0 -4.3 -1.0
Construction 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.5 -1.4
Communication 7.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -5.1 -1.2
Commercial services  6.8 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -4.1 -1.0
Other services  8.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -5.1 -1.2
Total 8.9 -1.5 0.1 0.0 -1.2 9.3 -1.5
Unskilled wages
* 1.1  Unskilled  non-farm  wage 1.1  Land rent  1.8 
Skilled wage  0.9           Unskilled farm wage  1.3  Capital rent  1.1 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3. 
*All wages and rents are given in real terms, i.e. these are percentage changes in wages relative to the CPI.   53
Table 6. Economic Impacts of Removing Duty Drawbacks and Halving Tariffs on 























Rice 2.8  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  -2.0  -0.5 
Wheat 1.1  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.5  -0.4  -0.2 
Feedgrains -0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  -0.8  -0.1 
Vegetables and fruits  1.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  -1.1  -0.4 
Oilseeds  0.6  0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 -0.2 
Sugar 1.7  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.4  -0.6  -0.3 
Plant based fibers  0.3  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.0  -0.9  -0.4 
Livestock & meat    2.2  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  -1.4  -0.3 
Dairy 2.7  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.6  -0.6  -0.4 
Other food  3.0  0.5  0.8  0.9  0.4  -1.7  -0.4 
Beverages & tobacco  4.5  2.2  2.4  2.3  0.7  -2.3  -0.4 
Extractive industries  1.8  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  -2.5  -0.5 
Textiles 0.3  0.8  0.7  0.6  1.0  -3.4  -2.5 
Apparel 0.3  -14.3  -2.6  -2.9  -1.7  21.0  -3.8 
Light manufacturing  1.1  0.7  1.0  0.9  3.0  -0.7  -1.9 
Petrochemical industry  2.4  -0.9  -0.7  -0.8  -0.8  4.4  -1.2 
Metals 4.9  -0.9  -0.3  -0.4  -0.9  3.6  -1.1 
Autos -18.8  -6.4  -11.9  -11.6  -6.3  -2.6  -3.0 
Electronics 1.7  2.9  2.2  2.2  2.9  -0.7  -1.1 
Other manufactures  3.1  -1.2  -0.1  -0.1  -1.1  5.3  -1.3 
Trade and transport  2.7  0.1  0.3  0.3  0.1  -2.9  -0.8 
Construction 5.0  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  -3.5  -1.0 
Communication 3.9  -0.1  0.1  0.0  -0.1  -3.6  -0.9 
Commercial services  4.5  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.1  -3.0  -0.8 
Other services  4.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -3.4  -0.9 
Total 1.3  -0.3  0.1  0.0  -0.2  1.4  -0.9 
Unskilled wages
* 0.4  Unskilled  non-farm  wage  0.3  Land rent  1.5 
Skilled wage  0.3           Unskilled farm wage  0.7  Capital rent  0.2 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3. 
*All wages and rents are given in real terms, i.e. these are percentage changes in wages relative to the CPI. 
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Rice 2.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -1.0 -0.4
Wheat -3.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 -4.3 -0.1
Feedgrains -2.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 -3.5 -0.1
Vegetables and fruits  -0.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 2.3 -0.2
Oilseeds -1.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 -0.9 -0.1
Sugar 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 -1.3 -0.2
Plant based fibers  -24.8 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.5 -9.5 0
Livestock & meat    -1.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 14.9 -0.3
Dairy -2.7 3.7 3.6 4.0 3.7 -20.6 -0.1
Other food  -1.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.5 -2.9 -0.3
Beverages & tobacco  -13.4 3.4 2.0 1.9 2.0 -3.6 -0.3
Extractive industries  -5.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.1
Textiles -9.9 6.1 2.1 2.3 6.1 -16.2 -0.3
Apparel -9.6 7.9 -6.1 -5.9 6.0 -12.1 -0.3
Light manufacturing  -5.1 9.5 0.5 0.5 9.0 -25.2 -0.3
Petrochemical industry  -3.5 1.2 0.8 0.7 1.2 -5.7 -0.4
Metals -1.5 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.2 -8.3 -0.5
Autos -51.0 2.5 -21.4 -19.7 2.5 -24.3 -0.4
Electronics -6.7 2.6 -2.4 -2.4 2.4 -5.3 -0.3
Other manufactures  -4.2 1.4 0.0 -0.1 1.4 -7.3 -0.5
Trade and transport  -2.6 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.1 -2.8 -0.6
Construction 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 -2.6 -0.6
Communication 2.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -3.5 -0.7
Commercial services  3.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 -3.1 -0.7
Other services  1.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 -3.1 -0.6
Total -7.4 1.1 -0.1 0.0 1.0 -7.9 -0.4
Unskilled wages
* -0.2  Unskilled  non-farm  wage  -0.3  Land rent  1.1 
Skilled wage  -0.3           Unskilled farm wage  0.0  Capital rent  -0.5 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3 and doubled elasticities of substitution 
between domestic and imported products and imports from difference sources. 
*All wages and rents are given in real terms, i.e. these are percentage changes in wages relative to the CPI.   55






















Rice  5.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 -4.2 -0.6
Wheat  1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 -0.3 -0.2
Feedgrains  1.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 -1.9 -0.1
Vegetables and fruits  3.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 -2.9 -0.5
Oilseeds  0.4 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 -0.1
Sugar  3.3 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.5 -1.4 -0.3
Plant based fibers  10.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 -2.4 -0.7
Livestock & meat    3.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 -2.8 -0.3
Dairy  4.7 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.6 -0.3
Other food  6.5 0.7 1.4 1.6 0.6 -3.5 -0.5
Beverages & tobacco  12.7 4.4 5.1 5.1 1.4 -5.0 -0.5
Extractive industries  10.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -7.8 -0.9
Textiles  12.2 -3.6 0.3 0.1 -2.9 8.6 -4.9
Apparel  13.0 -51.2 0.1 -0.8 -11.4 77.4 -8.5
Light manufacturing  11.6 -10.1 3.4 3.1 -1.5 32.8 -4.0
Petrochemical industry  11.5 -4.4 -3.2 -3.2 -4.2 21.1 -2.1
Metals  18.1 -4.2 -2.0 -2.0 -4.1 21.6 -1.8
Autos  8.6 -22.3 -8.6 -9.6 -22.1 23.7 -6.1
Electronics  13.6 6.6 10.4 10.2 6.8 3.7 -1.9
Other manufactures  15.7 -5.5 0.0 -0.1 -5.1 26.3 -2.2
Trade and transport  8.8 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.1 -6.0 -1.0
Construction  13.7 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -8.0 -1.4
Communication  10.2 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.3 -7.3 -1.2
Commercial services  9.6 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 -5.8 -0.9
Other services  12.0 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -7.2 -1.1
Total  13.2 -2.3 0.2 0.0 -1.8 14.3 -1.4
Unskilled wages
* 1.2  Unskilled  non-farm  wage  1.1  Land rent  2.4 
Skilled wage  1.0           Unskilled farm wage  1.5  Capital rent  1.1 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3 and doubled elasticities of substitution 
between domestic and imported products and imports from difference sources. 
*All wages and rents are given in real terms, i.e. these are percentage changes in wages relative to the CPI.   56
Appendix Table 3. Sensitivity analysis in the Case of Removing Duty Drawbacks and Halving 























Rice 3.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 -2.5 -0.4
Wheat -0.1 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.0 -0.1
Feedgrains -1.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.8 -0.1
Vegetables and fruits  0.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 -1.0 -0.3
Oilseeds -0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 -0.1
Sugar 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 -0.7 -0.2
Plant based fibers  -0.5 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.4 -1.0 -0.4
Livestock & meat    1.9 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 -1.2 -0.2
Dairy 3.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 -0.4 -0.3
Other food  3.8 0.7 1.0 1.1 0.6 -2.2 -0.4
Beverages & tobacco  6.3 3.1 3.4 3.3 0.9 -3.2 -0.4
Extractive industries  2.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 -3.5 -0.5
Textiles 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.5 -4.7 -2.5
Apparel 1.0 -21.7 -3.6 -4.0 -2.5 31.4 -3.9
Light manufacturing  1.9 0.4 1.3 1.2 4.0 0.5 -1.9
Petrochemical industry  3.7 -1.5 -1.1 -1.2 -1.4 6.8 -1.2
Metals 7.6 -1.4 -0.5 -0.6 -1.4 5.7 -1.1
Autos -26.7 -9.6 -17.2 -16.7 -9.5 -3.2 -3.0
Electronics 2.8 4.4 3.5 3.5 4.4 -1.0 -1.1
Other manufactures  5.0 -1.8 -0.1 -0.2 -1.7 8.3 -1.3
Trade and transport  4.0 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.1 -4.3 -0.8
Construction 7.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -5.2 -0.9
Communication 6.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -5.4 -0.9
Commercial services  6.8 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 -4.5 -0.8
Other services  6.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -5.0 -0.9
Total  2.1 -0.5 0.1 0.0 -0.3 2.4 -0.9
Unskilled wages
*  0.4  Unskilled non-farm wage  0.3  Land rent  1.8 
Skilled wage  0.3           Unskilled farm wage  0.7  Capital rent  0.2 
Source: Author’s simulations with the empirical model in section 3 and doubled elasticities of substitution 
between domestic and imported products and imports from difference sources. 
*All wages and rents are given in real terms, i.e. these are percentage changes in wages relative to the CPI. 